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Of
course, the flâneur was not to be found in Paris
alone. There was much wayward loitering in at least
two colonial cities, Dublin and Calcutta. This - especially
the emergence of the flâneur, or flâneur-like
activities, in modern, turn of the century Calcutta
- would have probably been difficult for Benjamin
to imagine. Benjamin's figure for the flâneur
was Baudelaire, and for Baudelaire - and, by extension,
for the flâneur - the East was, as it was for
Henri Rousseau, part dreamscape, part botanical garden,
part menagerie, part paradise. Could the flâneur
exist in that dreamscape? Dipesh Chakrabarty, the
author of Provincialising Europe, whose meditations
on the limits of Western notions of modernity and
history are impelled by Benjamin but who also has
the word 'postcolonial' in his subtitle, was born
in Calcutta. His inquiry is partly directed by the
contingencies of being a South Asian historian in
America, and also by being a founder member of the
subaltern studies project, which attempted to write
a South Asian or, specifically, Indian history 'from
below', by bringing the 'subaltern' (Gramsci's word
for the peasant or the economically dispossessed)
into the territory largely occupied by nationalist
history. But the inquiry is also shaped by the Calcutta
Chakrabarty was born in, much as Benjamin's work is
shaped by the Paris he reimagined and, to a certain
extent, invented. From the early 19th century, the
growing Bengali intelligentsia in Calcutta was increasingly
exercised by what 'modernity' might mean and what
the experience of modernity might represent, specifically,
to a subject nation, and, universally, to a human
being. Chakrabarty's book is not only an unusually
sustained and nuanced argument against European ideas
of modernity, but also an elegy for, and subtle critique
of, his own intellectual formation and inherit-ance
as a Bengali. The kind of Bengali who was synonymous
with modernity and who believed that modernity might
be a universal condition - irrespective of whether
you're English, Indian, Arab or African - has now
passed into extinction. Chakrabarty's book is in part
a discreet inquiry into why that potent Bengali dream
didn't quite work - why 'modernity' remains so resolutely
European.
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Chakrabarty's
writing is not without irony or humour;
the cheeky oxymoron of the title is one
example. At least a quarter of Chakrabarty's
work was done, and his challenge given
an idiom, when he reinvented this terrific
phrase, which was probably first used
with slightly more literal intent by Gadamer.
According to Ranajit Guha, who is or used
to be to subalternist historians roughly
what Jesus was to the apostles, the 'idea
of provincialising Europe' had 'been around
for some time, but mostly as an insight
waiting for elaboration' before Chakrabarty
articulated and substantiated it so thoroughly.
The 'idea' itself is set out and argued
for in the introductory chapter. Chakrabarty
begins with a disclaimer: 'Provincialising
Europe is not a book about the region
of the world we call "Europe".
That Europe, one could say, has already
been provincialised by history itself.'
The essay has two epigraphs: the first,
from Gadamer, seems to speak of Europe
as a 'region of the world'; the second,
more tellingly, from Naoki Sakai, describes
the 'West' as 'a name for a subject which
gathers itself in discourse but is also
an object constituted discursively'. What
Chakrabarty wants to do with 'Europe',
then, is in some ways similar to what
Edward Said did with the 'Orient': to
fashion a subversive genealogy. But instead
of Said's relentless polemic, Chakrabarty's
book features critique and self-criticism
in equal measure. For me, Chakrabarty
has the edge here, because for Said the
Orient is a Western construct, an instrument
of domination: he doesn't - and never
went on to - explore the profound ways
in which modern Orientals (Tagore, say)
both were and were not Orientalists. Chakrabarty's
work suggests, I think, that the word
'Eurocentric' is more problematic than
we thought; that, if Europe is a universal
paradigm for modernity, we are all, European
and non-European, to a degree inescapably
Eurocentric. Europe is at once a means
of intellectual dominance, an obfuscatory
trope and a constituent of self-knowledge,
in different ways for different peoples
and histories.
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Said's
great study takes its cue from the many-sided and
endlessly absorbing Foucault, in its inexhaustible
conviction and its curiosity about how a body of
knowledge - in this case, Orientalism - can involve
the exercise of power. Much postcolonial theory,
in turn, has taken its cue from Said and this strain
of Foucault. Chakrabarty's book comes along at a
time when this line of inquiry, which has had its
own considerable rewards and pitfalls, seems one-dimensional
and exhausted. In spite of the 'postcolonial' in
the subtitle, it owes little to the fecund but somewhat
simplified Foucauldian paradigm. Instead, its inspiration
seems post-structuralist and Derridean, and it rehearses
a key moment in Derrida: the idea that it is necessary
to dismantle or take on the language of 'Western
metaphysics' (which for Derrida is almost everything
that precedes post-structuralism and, in effect,
himself), but that there is no alternative language
available with which to dismantle it - so that the
language must be turned on itself. For Derrida's
'Western metaphysics' Chakrabarty substitutes 'European
thought' and 'social science thought':
European
thought . . . is both indispensable and inadequate
in helping us to think through the various
life practices that constitute the political
and the historical in India. Exploring - on
both theoretical and factual registers - this
simultaneous indispensability and inadequacy
of social science thought is the task this
book has set itself. |
This
is not very far from Derrida, who writes at an important
juncture in Writing and Difference of
conserving
all these old concepts within the domain of
empirical discovery while here and there denouncing
their limits, treating them as tools that
can still be used. No longer is any truth
value attributed to them: there is a readiness
to abandon them, if necessary, should other
instruments appear more useful. In the meantime,
their relative efficacy is exploited, and
they are employed to destroy the old machinery
to which they belong and of which they themselves
are pieces. This is how the language of the
social sciences criticises itself. |
Derrida
is reflecting here on Lévi-Strauss, who when
confronted with South American myths finds the tools
of his trade obsolete but still indispensable. The
idea of Chakrabarty registering a similarly self-reflexive
moment about thirty years later, in relation to
Europe, modernity and 'life practices . . . in India',
is poignant and ironic: he belongs to the other
side of the racial and historical divide; to a part
of the world that should have been, at least in
Lévi-Strauss's time, and by ordinary European
estimation, the object rather than the instigator
of the social scientist's discipline. It would have
been next to impossible for Lévi-Strauss
to foretell that something resembling his anxiety
about the social sciences would one day be rehearsed
in the work of a man with a name like Dipesh Chakrabarty.
And
this, of course, is the crux of Chakrabarty's book.
'Historicism - and even the modern, European idea
of history - one might say, came to non-European
peoples in the 19th century as somebody's way of
saying "not yet" to somebody else.' To
illustrate what he means, he turns to John Stuart
Mill's On Liberty and On Representative
Government - 'both of which,' Chakrabarty says,
'proclaimed self-rule as the highest form of government
and yet argued against giving Indians or Africans
self-rule.'
According
to Mill, Indians or Africans were not
yet civilised enough to rule themselves.
Some historical time of development and civilisation
(colonial rule and education, to be precise)
had to elapse before they could be considered
prepared for such a task. Mill's historicist
argument thus consigned Indians, Africans
and other 'rude' nations to an imaginary waiting-room
of history. |
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The
'imaginary waiting-room of history'
is another of Chakrabarty's compressed,
telling images. I don't know if he
picked it up from the German playwright
Heiner Müller, who uses it of
the 'Third World' in a 1989 interview;
but he employs it to great effect.
The phrase has purgatorial resonances:
you feel that those who are in the
waiting-room are going to be there
for some time. For modernity has already
had its authentic incarnation in Europe:
how then can it happen again, elsewhere?
The non-West - the waiting-room -
is therefore doomed either never to
be quite modern, to be, in Naipaul's
phrase, 'half-made'; or to possess
only a semblance of modernity. This
is a view of history and modernity
that has, according to Chakrabarty,
at once liberated, defined and shackled
us in its discriminatory universalism;
it is a view powerfully theological
in its determinism, except that the
angels, the blessed and the excluded
are real people, real communities. |
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Chakrabarty's
thesis might seem obvious once stated; but the 'insight
waiting for elaboration', to use Ranajit Guha's
words, must find the best and, in the positive sense
of the word, most opportunistic expositor. In Chakrabarty,
I think it has. (The urge to provincialise Europe
has, of course, a very long unofficial history.
It's embodied in jokes and throwaway remarks such
as the one Gandhi made when asked what he thought
of Western civilisation: 'I think it would be a
good idea.' Shashi Tharoor is having a dig at historicism
when he says, in The Great Indian Novel,
'India is not an underdeveloped country. It is a
highly developed country in an advanced state of
decay.') Chakrabarty has given us a vocabulary with
which to speak of matters somewhat outside the realm
of the social sciences, and to move discussions
on literature, cultural politics and canon formation
away from the exclusively Saidian concerns of power-brokering,
without entirely ignoring these concerns. |
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